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Fuller and Whitten: Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis,

relationship between collection and
analysis that is in need of further study.
In spite of the book’s shortcomings,
Marrin offers readers a look at what
a junior CIA analyst does and offers
a sketch of how to move beyond the
“generalized intuition” that often afflicts
intelligence analysis. His discussion of
improving intelligence analysis through
empathy is interesting and has implications for personnel recruiting. In fact,
this slim volume should be valued by
human-resources departments and
senior managers as they prepare for the
next reorganizations of their agencies.
DEREK REVERON

Naval War College

Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of
the Next Global Crisis. New York: Penguin Group,
2011. 304pp. $26.95

Is the United States now engaged in a
currency war? Are we involved in an
international competition of currency
devaluation that will impact America
in seldom-studied ways that are critical
to its defense? James Rickards suggests
that we are, and that today’s currency war could be as devastating to
national security as any kinetic war.
James Rickards is a counselor, investment banker, and risk manager with
over thirty years of experience in
capital markets. He advises the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, and major hedge funds
on global finance. He served as a facilitator for the first-ever financial war
games conducted by the Pentagon.
Rickards argues that currency conflicts should and must interest our
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military leaders. Such conflicts can
and should be prepared for, because
the cheap-dollar policies of both the
present and immediate past administrations portend a dollar crisis. Rickards
argues that policy makers have lost the
enormous national-security advantages that dollar hegemony affords,
by adopting weak-dollar policies.
In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagonsponsored “war” gaming in 2009, using
rules of engagement (ROE) in which the
only “weapons” allowed were currencies,
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because
the specific ROE were unrealistic,
however, the results were inconclusive,
although useful for future simulations.
Then, in part 2, the author delves into
historical accounts of what he calls
“Currency War I” (1921–36) and
“Currency War II” (1967–87). Rickards
argues that we have now entered
“Currency War III,” the three primary
combatants being the United States,
China, and Europe. He argues that there
are four possible outcomes of Currency
War III: a move to multiple reserve currencies, with the dollar playing a much
smaller role; an International Monetary
Fund–controlled world money, called
“Special Drawing Rights”; a return to
the gold standard, at a substantially
higher gold price (the prospect endorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last
possibility and the associated dollar collapse appears most likely to the author.
It is unfortunate that Rickards did not
include any reference to Edward S.
Miller’s Bankrupting the Enemy: The
U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl
Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 2007),
written by a skilled financial analyst
who discusses in great detail how the
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration
used dollar hegemony to block Japan
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from world financial markets. One
could argue that Currency War I culminated on 25 July 1941 with Executive
Order 8832, which froze Japanese financial assets. Dollar hegemony was an
essential national-security tool used to
deprive Japan of the resources needed to
wage war. Miller’s work is a useful illustration of the utility of a strong dollar.
In summary, Rickards provides an
excellent account of the currency
wars. He provides information that
should be at the fingertips of every national security planner.
EDWARD FULLER, Incline Village, Nevada, and
ROBERT C. WHITTEN, Cupertino, California

Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds. In
Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the
Berlin Wall and 9/11. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2011. 243pp. $19.95

This collection of ten essays focuses
on the American government’s foreign
policy through three administrations
after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9
November 1989, and also after the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Editors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro
examine these events from the perspectives of both the policy makers who
were active in Presidents George H. W.
Bush’s, Bill Clinton’s, and George W.
Bush’s administrations and scholars
who have analyzed the government’s
actions. Government response to these
events provides strong examples of
how the United States reacts in times
of uncertainty. The editors chose the
Berlin Wall and 9/11 because both
events impacted the global order to an
extent requiring a complete reexamination of the nation’s foreign policy.
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The chapters written by scholars
provide excellent background, discussing the situations before, during, and
after the events. However, the chapters
written by government officials involved
in policy decisions greatly enhance and
increase the success of this work. The
collaborators from these administrations have yet to publish their individual
memoirs, making their perspectives
not only unique but refreshing.
In his essay, “Shaping the Future: Planning at the Pentagon, 1989–1993,” Paul
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy during George H. W. Bush’s
administration and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense during George W. Bush’s
administration, discusses how defense
decisions made at the end of the Cold
War influenced decisions after 9/11. His
analysis of the similarities between strategic decisions made in 1989 and 2001,
as well as of the impact that the 1989
decisions had on 2001 strategy plans,
is one of the most interesting parts
of this book. Eric Edelman also does
this especially well in his “The Strange
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance,” in which he compares the
1992 Defense Planning Guidance to
2002’s National Security Strategy. He
served George W. Bush as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security Affairs.
John Mueller, who holds the Woody
Hayes Chair of National Security
Studies at the Mershon Center, takes
an approach different from those of
his fellow collaborators in “Questing for Monsters to Destroy.” He adds
2 September 1945, the end of World
War II, and the Korean invasion by the
North Koreans on 25 June 1950 as
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